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Fourth Amendment Implications of
Warrantless Occupational Safety
and Health Act Inspections
I. Introduction
Government regulation of business enterprises has grown dramat-
ically in recent years and has increased the need for new and more
effective investigative techniques to implement and enforce these regula-
tions. Commonly, broad statutory authorization of official entry upon
commercial premises has permitted administrative agencies to enforce
regulatory laws.
1
The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)2 is a product of the
growth of government regulation of business. Technological advances
and new processes brought new hazards to the work place. Society had
begun to feel the economic impact of waste through industrial disabilities,
lost wages, and payment of workmen's compensation. 3 OSHA was enact-
ed to confront this situation by providing a system of promulgating and
enforcing standards to improve job safety. It has been referred to as a
"'Magna Carta' for the worker."
4
To protect the worker, OSHA provides authority for the Secretary of
Labor to "enter without delay" 5 any worksite and make an investigation
or inspection. In carrying out the purposes of OSHA, however, care must
be taken not to ignore the rights of either employee or employer. The Act
does not explicitly authorize warrantless inspections since "enter without
delay" need not, and should not, be equated with "without a warrant."
"Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty
when the Government's purposes are beneficient. "6 Well-recognized
constitutional guarantees of privacy must be considered in the context of
business, health, and safety inspections and protected by the requirement
of obtaining a warrant before inspection.
This comment will discuss the developing law regarding the inspec-
I. See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543-44 (1967).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1970).
3. As a result of industrial accidents 14,500 persons are killed annually. A minimum
of 2.2 million persons are disabled on the job each year, resulting in the loss of 250 million
man-days of work. Lost wages amount to over $1.5 billion. S. REP. No. 91-1282, 91 st Cong.,
2d Sess. 2-4, reprinted in [19701 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5177, 5178.
4. TRIAL, July/August 1973, at 12-13.
5. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, §8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 657(a)(1) (1970).
6. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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tion provisions of OSHA7 in light of the Supreme Court's treatment of the
inspection provisions of other statutes.8 The conflicting decisions on the
OSHA inspection provision, the need for a warrant requirement, its effect
on the constitutionality of the Act's inspection provision, and the stan-
dards for issuing the warrant are also probed.
II. OSHA: General Coverage and Provisions
Congress enacted OSHA in the exercise of its power to regulate
commerce 9 upon a finding that the injuries and illnesses arising out of the
work environment, with resultant loss of production and wages, impose a
substantial burden on interstate commerce.10 OSHA's purpose is "to
provide for the general welfare, to assure so far as possible every working
man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and
to preserve our human resources."
1 !
To accomplish this purpose, the Act was given very broad applica-
bility. Its coverage extends to all "person[s] engaged in a business
affecting commerce who [have] employees." ' 12 The phrase "affecting
commerce" has been recognized by the courts as an expression used by
Congress to signal an intention to go beyond the regulation of businesses
engaged "in commerce" to the full extent of the commerce power.
13
Thus, courts have found that interstate commerce has been affected by
wholly intrastate activities that affect the free flow of commerce, by the
use of the mails, or by use of articles or services purchased intrastate but
incorporating elements imported from out of state. 4 Given this broad
7. See LaFave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Camara
and See Cases, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 1 (1967); Sonnenreich & Pinco, The Inspector Knocks:
Administrative Inspection Warrants Under an Expanded Fourth Amendment, 24 Sw. L.J.
418 (1970); Note, Administrative Search Warrants, 58 MINN. L. REV. 607 (1974); 37 U.
CINN. L. REV. 243 (1968).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 657 (1970). For a discussion of other statutes authorizing administra-
tive inspections, see Terraciano v. Montanye, 493 F.2d 682 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
875 (1974) (warrantless inspection of pharmacy records pursuant to New York health statute
upheld); United States v. Business Builders, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 141 (N.D. Okla. 1973) (court
sanctioned warrantless inspection under Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act on grounds
that statute takes the place of a valid search warrant); United States v. Montrom, 345 F.
Supp. 1337 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd, 480 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1973) (warrantless search under the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 held constitutional); United
States v. Del Campo Baking Mfg. Co., 345 F. Supp. 1371 (D. Del. 1972) (warrantless
inspection under Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act upheld because of pervasive
regulation of the business); United States v. Western & At. R.R., 297 F. 482 (N.D. Ga.
1924) (warrantless search under the Railway Safety Appliance Act found constitutional).
9. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970).
10. Id. See 116 CONG. REC. 38375-76 (1970) (remarks of Congressman Daniels of New
Jersey who states that 80% of America's working people work in places where no type of
health service is provided. He discusses some appalling results from exposure to work
places contaminated by chemicals and radiation that have been reported at congressional
hearings and notes inadequacies of state laws that deal primarily with violent physical
injuries rather than environmental hazards from fumes and chemicals that threaten "silent"
death and disability).
11. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970).
12. Id. § 3(5), 29 U.S.C. § 652(5).
13. Brennan v. OSHRC, 492 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974).
14. See, e.g., Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975) (general raises to state
construction, the coverage of OSHA -is virtually limitless except for
possible preemption to the extent that other federal and state agencies
have exercised statutory authority to prescribe or enforce regulations
affecting occupational health and safety. 5
The Act provides for inspections by the Secretary of Labor as a
method of enforcement:
(a) In order to carry out the purposes of this chapter, the
Secretary, upon presenting appropriate credentials to the own-
er, operator, or agent in charge, is authorized-
(1) to enter without delay and at reasonable times
any factory, plant, establishment, construction site, or
other area, workplace or environment where work is per-
formed by an employee of an employer; and
(2) to inspect and investigate during regular working
hours and at other reasonable times, and within reasonable
limits and in a reasonable manner, any such place of em-
ployment and all pertinent conditions, structures, ma-
chines, apparatus, devices, equipment, and materials
therein, and to question privately any such employer, own-
er, operator, agent or employee.
16
The Act provides for both civil and criminal penalties. Civil penal-
ties are imposed for repeated or willful violations, nonserious violations,
serious violations, or violations of the posting requirements. 17 Criminal
penalties may be imposed for willfully violating a standard or regulation,
thus causing the death of an employee, giving advance notice of an
inspection without proper authority, or making a false statement in any
document required to be maintained pursuant to the Act.'" These viola-
tions carry heavy fines and up to six months imprisonment. 19 Also,
anyone who forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or
interferes with an inspector engaged in the performance of his official
duties is subject to criminal liability of up to three years imprisonment.20
employees, although they are engaged in a wholly intrastate activity, affect commerce by
injecting extra purchasing power into the economy); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969)
(restaurant found to affect commerce when a substantial part of the food it served moved in
commerce and records played in the jukebox were manufactured out of state); Polish-
National Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643 (1944) (fraternal organization whose activities
included mailing a newspaper to its members 80% of which lived outside its state of
incorporation found to affect commerce).
15. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 4 (b)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(1)
(1970).
16. Id. § 8, 29 U.S.C § 657.
17. Id. §§ 17(a)-17(d),(i), 29 U.S.C. §§ 666(a)-666(d), 666(h).
18. Id. §§ 17(e)-17(g), 29 U.S.C. §§ 666(e)-666(g).
19. Id. Commentators have discussed the criminal nature of the OSHA penalties and
their predominantly punitive character. Comment, OSHA: Employer Beware, 10 Hous. L.
REV. 426 (1973); Comment, OSHA Penalties: Some Constitutional Considerations, 10 IDAHO
L. REV. 223 (1974).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 11 (1970). Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-596, § 17(h), 84 Stat. 1607 (1970), amended 18 U.S.C. § 1114 (1964) to include OSHA
inspectors within its protection, and 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1970) protects any person designated
in 18 U.S.C. § 1114 (1970) from the actions named. The meaning within this section of
"forcibly" is unclear. It has been held that actual active force is not necessary and any
conduct resulting in bodily fear and terror is sufficient. Armstrong v. Vicksburg, Shreveport
Ill. Development of the Law of Administrative Search and Seizure:
Supreme Court Treatment
The provisions of OSHA, specifically the inspection provision,
when interpreted in light of the constitutional treatment of other adminis-
trative enforcement provisions by the Supreme Court, clarify the deci-
sions on OSHA rendered by the lower courts.
A. The Camara and See Turnaround
In District of Columbia v. Little,21 Judge Prettyman announced that
"[t]o say that a man suspected of crime has a right to protection against
search of his home without a warrant, but that a man not suspected of a
crime has no such protection, is a fantastic absurdity." 22 Although it did
not reach the constitutional issue, the court rejected the notion that an
inspection differed fundamentally from a search 23 and placed inspections
squarely within the purview of the fourth amendment.
Little proved to be no more than an aberration, however, because in
the first definitive case on administrative searches, Frank v. Maryland,24
the United States Supreme Court declared these searches totally outside
the scope of the fourth amendment.25 This conclusion followed from the
Court's construction that the fourth amendment embodies a hierarchy of
interests. Of greater import than the privacy interest is the interest in
security or self-protection-the right to resist unauthorized entry to gather
information to be used against the individual in a criminal prosecution.
As a consequence of this alignment the Court necessarily concluded that
municipal housing code inspections touch at most the periphery of the
interests protected by the fourth amendment, 26 and, therefore, constitu-
tional restrictions should not be invoked.
The Frank vindication of the long-exercised power to make warrant-
less administrative searches was not long-lived,27 for eight years later, in
& Pacific R.R., 46 La. Ann. 1448, 16 So. 468 (La. 1894). A mere intent to deceive or the
locking of a door does not constitute forcible interference. District of Columbia v. Little,
339 U.S. 1 (1950). See Long v. United States, 199 F.2d 717 (4th Cir. 1952).
21. 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd on othergrounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
22. Id. at 17. These were the first rumblings questioning the constitutionality of the
long-accepted practice of warrantless administrative searches.
23. To say that the people in requiring adoption of the Fourth Amendment, meant
to restrict invasion of their homes if government officials were looking for some-
thing, but not to restrict it if the officials were merely looking, is to ascribe to the
electorate of that day and to the several legislatures and the Congress a degree of
irrationality not otherwise observable in their dealings with potential tyranny.
Id. at 18.
24. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
25. Id. at 366.
26. Id. at 367.
27. The facts in Frank, which was decided on a close vote (5-4), indicated that
probable cause to initiate the search was present. The health inspectors acted on a neigh-
bor's complaint and noted the unhealthy condition of appellant's residence and found rat
feces piled outside. Moreover, the statute that authorized the search was strictly limited,
permitting inspections only during the daytime and only upon a finding of valid grounds for
suspicion. Thus, the abuse was not as great as it might be in other warrantless searches.
Camara v. Municipal Court,28 the Supreme Court, as it overruled Frank,
reassessed the extent of the intrusion resulting from an administrative
search and the applicability of the fourth amendment. The Court
concluded that "except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a
search of private property without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless
it has been authorized by a valid search warrant."
29
In Camara, a department of health official attempted a routine
annual inspection of an apartment for housing violations, which the
tenant refused to allow without a search warrant. 30 The Court found that
the inspection not only affected peripheral fourth amendment interests,
but was a significant invasion of those rights. 31 The criminal/civil distinc-
tion espoused in Frank was rejected 32 because it did not bear on the extent
to which the intrusion jeopardized privacy. Arguments of administrative
efficiency and convenience, as well as the public interest in the effective
enforcement of the statute, were dismissed in favor of preserving the
beneficial purposes served by requiring a warrant." A warrant require-
ment would assure the resident that enforcement of the code not only
mandated, but would also specify the lawful limits of the inspection and
prove the officer was acting under proper authorization.
34
In recognition of the need for area code enforcement to satisfy the
purposes of the municipal housing code and the reasonableness of area
enforcement that is demonstrated by its long-standing acceptance, im-
portant public interest, and limited privacy invasion, the Court re-
fashioned traditional probable cause requirements." The resulting test
requires compliance with specific, limited administrative standards.
36
Although Camara concerned searches of residential dwellings, See
v. Seattle37 extended the warrant requirement to commercial premises. In
See, an inspector from the city fire department, during a routine investi-
28. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
29. Id. at 528-29.
30. Id. at 526-27.
31. Id. at 530-31.
32. But cf. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs. 408 F. Supp. 321, 361 n.56 (D.D.C.
1976), aff'd, 45 U.S.L.W. 4917 (1977) (the Supreme Court agreed with the lower court's
finding that the fourth amendment warrant requirement was not applicable to the search of
presidential documents. The lower court relied heavily on a distinction drawn between civil
and criminal investigations).
33. In assessing whether the public interest demands creation of a general excep-
tion to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, the question is not whether
the public interest justifies the type of search in question, but whether the authority
to search should be evidenced by a warrant, which in turn depends in part upon
whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental
purpose behind the search.
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967).
34. Id. at 532.
35. Probable cause has been defined generally as "a reasonable ground for suspicion,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in
the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged." I J.
VARON, SEARCHES, SEIZURES AND IMMUNITIES, 116 (2d ed. 1974); accord, Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
36. See note 186 and accompanying text infra.
37. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
gation, was refused entry to inspect a locked commercial warehouse
because he lacked a warrant.38 The Court recognized that a businessman,
like the residential homeowner, has the right to be free from unreasonable
official entries, 39 but showed some willingness to expand the instances in
which a warrantless inspection would be held reasonable.
0
Thus, Camara and See evidence a three point scale of values in
granting warrants. Searches for criminal evidence are tested most rigor-
ously against the traditional inflexible standard of probable cause. 41 The
home, which is ranked second in degree of protection, is subject to search
if the purpose of the inspection outweighs the right of privacy. Third,
search of commercial property is subject to the same balancing test,
although privacy is considered less important than in the home and thus
weighs less heavily against the purpose of the inspection.
2
B. Narrowing the Camara Warrant Requirement
See specifically refrained from questioning the validity of warrant-
less inspections of establishments before they are licensed. 4 3 The issue
came to the Court's attention in Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States44 in which the Supreme Court considered a search of premises
licensed to serve alcoholic beverages. Agents from the Alcohol and
Tobacco Tax Division of the Internal Revenue Service wanted to inspect
a locked liquor storeroom to which they had been refused entry.45 The
agent broke the lock and removed some bottles. 46 The Court suggested
that a warrantless search was reasonable.47
38. Id.
39. See, however, distinguished between public and nonpublic areas of a commercial
establishment and extended fourth amendment protection only to the latter. In effect, the
Court adapted the "open fields" doctrine of Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924), to
the commercial setting with the result that evidence seen by the investigator from any place
where he is not trespassing is not subject to the protection of the fourth amendment. Note, 5
ENVT'L L. 147, 151(1974).
40. 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967). The Camara and See cases have been recognized as
significant departures from the traditional all-or-nothing approach of either finding strict
probable cause or abandoning the fourth amendment protection entirely. Instead, the
balance of interests approach used in Camara and See results in a modification of fourth
amendment protection, yielding a more flexible standard of probable cause. A similar
process is used in the stop and frisk situation in which the traditional probable cause
determination remains the same, but requires a less complete factual showing. Greenberg,
The Balance of Interests Theory and the Fourth Amendment: A Selective Analysis of
Supreme Court Action Since Camara and See, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 1011 (1973).
41. The traditional standard is defined in note 35 supra.
42. Denenberg, Administrative Searches and the Right to Privacy in the United States,
23 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 169, 175-76 (1974).
43. We do not in any way imply that business premises may not reasonably be
inspected in many more situations than private homes, nor do we question such
accepted regulatory techniques as licensing programs which require inspections
prior to operating a business or marketing a product. Any constitutional challenge
to such programs can only be resolved . . . on a case-by-case basis under the
general Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness.
387 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1967).
44. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
45. Entry was sought pursuant to I.R.C. §§ 5146(b), 7606.
46. 397 U.S. 72, 73 (1970).
47. The Court avoided dealing directly with the question of authorizing warrantless
The facts of Camara and See were distinguished in Colonnade on
two grounds. First, it was noted that liquor had long been subject to
federal regulation and Congress has broad power to counter abuses in the
liquor industry and determine reasonable standards for search and sei-
zure.48 Second, the inspection was carried out as part of a licensing
program while the See and Camara searches were based on regula-
tions .9
These distinctions were further developed in United States v. Bis-
well, 50 which squarely reviewed the question of warrantless inspections
of licensed businesses and found them permissible under the fourth
amendment. Authority was found under the Gun Control Act 5' to conduct
a warrantless inspection of the premises of a pawn shop that carried a
license to sell guns.
Although it was acknowledged that the history of federal regulation
in gun control was not as "deeply rooted" 2 as in the liquor industry, the
Court found that the public had such a great interest in preventing crime
that warrantless inspection of gun shops was crucial.53 Shying away from
the warrant requirement, the Court concluded that such a requirement
would cause limitations in scope, frequency, and surprise of inspections
and portended possible frustration of the statutory purpose. It noted the
careful limitations on time, place, and scope of the search imposed by the
statute in further support of the constitutionality of a warrantless search.
As a last rationale, the Court articulated an implied consent theory that
had been intimated in Colonnade. The Justices proposed that a busi-
nessman who engages in regulated enterprises accepts the burdens as well
as the benefits of the regulation and is deemed to consent to the restric-
tions placed upon him. The threat to privacy is minimal because knowl-
edge of the probability of inspection limits justifiable expectations of
privacy.M
Thus, Biswell and Colonnade laid the foundation for a potentially
broad exception to the Camara warrant requirement when there is histor-
ical support for the regulation, an urgent federal interest, a narrowly
searches of licensed establishments by commenting that Congress did not authorize war-
rantless entries, but, instead, made it an offense for licensees to refuse admission to an
inspector. The Court found that Congress has the power to authorize warrantless searches.
It simply was not exercised in this case. Id. at 77.
48. Id. at 76-77.
49. Id. See is limited to inspections preceding the operation of a licensed establish-
ment. The Court never addressed this distinction, but construed the language to include all
ongoing businesses of licensees. Id.
50. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
51. Gun Control Act of 1968, § 102, 18 U.S.C. § 923(g) (1970).
52. 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972).
53. Greenberg argues that the public interest cannot be juxtaposed with the individual
interest in privacy to make the warrant determination because a valid public interest can
almost always be found. Certainly an interest in deterring and preventing crime exists, but
such an interest does not justify the abandonment of the search warrant in criminal cases.
Greenberg, supra note 40.
54. 406 U.S. 311, 316-17 (1972).
limited statute, and a license. This is particularly true since Biswell's
holding was not limited to firearms.
55
Wyman v. James56 soon created a second exception by focusing on
the nature of the penalty for refusing entry, rather than on the type of
premises being searched. Wyman held that a warrantless visit to a welfare
recipient was not only reasonable in terms of the fourth amendment, but
did not constitute a search at all and, therefore, was not subject to the
fourth amendment.57 In distinguishing Camara, the Court created a new
warrant exception that applies when the only possible sanction for refus-
ing to permit inspection is loss of a government benefit rather than the
criminal sanctions that ensued in the Camara case.
58
It has been argued that Camara and See were losing force59 and
wide gaps in the warrant requirement were opening because of the
Court's balancing the public interest in regulation against the individual
interest in privacy.
C. Reaffirmation of Camara and See
The anticipated retreat from the fourth amendment warrant require-
ments was soon dispelled in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 6° in
which the Supreme Court reiterated its intolerance of exemptions to the
warrant requirement. The Court struck down roving warrantless searches
under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 6' which provided for warrant-
less searches of automobiles and other vehicles within a reasonable
distance of any United States boundary. 62
55. "[W]here, as here, regulatory inspections further urgent federal interest and the
possibilities of abuse and the threat to privacy are not of impressive dimensions, the
inspection may proceed without a warrant where specifically authorized by statute." Id. at
317. Several cases did interpret Biswell broadly. United States v. Montrom, 345 F. Supp.
1337, 1139 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd, 480 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1973), found that Biswell's principles
were applicable to all businesses in which there is a legitimate public interest in close
regulation. The court, however, deemed it unnecessary to address the problem of warrant-
less searches since a warrant had been obtained. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton,
364 F. Supp. 45, 49 (S.D. Ohio 1973), extended this reasoning and established an exception
that applies when there is a statutory regulation of business pursuant to government police
power permitting warrantless entry and applied the exception to uphold a warrantless
inspection of a coal mine.
56. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
57. Id. at 318.
58. The Court discussed the following circumstances supporting the reasonableness
of the search: (I) motivation of benevolent interest in the child; (2) fulfillment of a public
trust in assuring its funds are properly spent; (3) unobtrusive, friendly nature of the visit; (4)
lack of other methods of acquiring needed information; (5) lack of any purpose to conduct
the visit in aid of a criminal proceeding. The Court observed that a warrant could be harmful
in inducing a hostile arm's length element when an atmosphere of trust should be fostered.
In addition, if a warrant were obtained, it would give more authority than is needed or
desired. It would justify entry by force and permit a greater scope of inspection than simply
allowing the caseworker to see the child in the home and assure that he is receiving the
benefit of the aid. Id. at 318-24.
59. Brennan v. Buckeye Industries, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D. Ga. 1974).
60. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
61. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (1970). But cf. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543
(1976) (constitutionality of warrantless border searches at a fixed point upheld).
62. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 287(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1970).
The Court, as in Camara and See, was concerned with the unfet-
tered discretion of the officer in the field to conduct these roving searches
without probable cause. 63 The Justices were not deterred by ready argu-
ments of convenience and exigency. 64 They limited the Colonnade and
Biswell exception to pervasively regulated licensed industries in which
consent could be implied and privacy expectations were more cir-
cumscribed. Finally, the Court noted that in Colonnade and Biswell
those authorized to inspect knew that the premises were used for the sale
of guns and liquor, while in the random search of cars near the border
there was no assurance that the areas being searched were "within the
proper scope of official scrutiny."65
In G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States,66 the Court again strictly
limited Biswell and espoused the Camara principles. A warrantless
search of petitioner's office had been undertaken pursuant to statutory
authorization. 67 The Court found that the warrantless search was unjus-
tified because the intrusion was not grounded on the nature of the
business, a license, or any regulation of activities, but entailed the
"normal" enforcement of the tax law. 68 It focused on the unlimited
discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury to choose the location to be
invaded and the type of property to be seized. Thus, even discretion at a
higher level in the enforcement organization than the field officers con-
sidered in Camara and Almeida troubled the Court.
69
The Supreme Court has not voiced any far-reaching exceptions to
warrant requirement. Rather, in the limited circumstances in which there
exists pervasive regulation, a need to achieve efficient operation of
statutory provisions, and limited expectations of privacy, a warrant may
not be required. The problem lies in the individual determination of how
pervasive the regulation, how impaired the operation of the statute, and
how limited the expectations of privacy must be to qualify for this
exception.
63. The search in the present case was conducted in the unfettered discretion of
the members of the Border Patrol. . . . The search thus embodied precisely the
evil the Court saw in Camara when it insisted that the 'discretion of the official in
the field' be circumscribed by obtaining a warrant prior to the inspection.
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 270 (1973).
64. It is not enough to argue, as does the Government, that the problem. . . is a
serious one. The needs of law enforcement stand in constant tension with the
Constitution's protections of the individual against certain exercises of official
power. It is precisely the predictability of these pressures that counsels a resolute
loyalty to constitutional safeguards.
Id. at 273.
65. Id. at 271.
66. 429 U.S. 338 (1977).
67. I.R.C. §§ 6331(a), 6331(b) (permitting the IRS to collect back taxes by levy on
property, which includes the power to seize property by any means).
68. 429 U.S. 338, 354 (1977).
69. Another decision by the Supreme Court, Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western
Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974), although it held that a warrant was not required, is
consistent with Camara and See principles because the evidence was not collected from a
private part of the plant, but was in plain view. Note, 5 ENVT'L L. 147, 151 (1974).
Warrantless OSHA inspections are invalid unless they qualify under
one of the limited exceptions established by the Supreme Court. It is
possible, however, that were the fourth amendment interpreted differ-
ently, warrantless OSHA inspections could be upheld on the basis of
reasonableness alone.
D. Fourth Amendment Considerations
The fourth amendment 7 forbids unreasonable searches and estab-
lishes certain requirements for the issuance of a warrant. The balancing of
these considerations determines whether a warrantless search is unreason-
able per se or merely presumptively unreasonable. Conflicting conclu-
sions have resulted from the extent of dependency that is deemed to exist
between the two clauses of the fourth amendment. 71 The Supreme Court
in See interpreted Camara to hold warrantless searches of homes are
presumptively unreasonable. 72 Yet See contains language indicating that
warrantless inspection of certain nonpublic parts of business premises is
always invalid because inspection of those areas "may only be compelled
• . .within the framework of a warrant procedure."
73
Conflicts in the recent case law 74 have left unsettled the question
whether a search may constitutionally be measured against a reasonable-
ness standard alone or whether a warrant is mandatory.7" The Court in
Camara asserted a strict dependency view of the fourth amendment
clauses, stating that except in very narrowly defined classes of cases, a
search of private property without proper consent is unreasonable unless
70. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. iv.
71. Different authors have taken opposing stances on this issue. Carden, Federal
Power to Seize and Search Without Warrant, 18 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1964), finds the clauses
completely dependent. Under this interpretation the second clause establishing standards
for issuing warrants provides an exclusive method for initiating a reasonable search. The
independence of the two clauses is advocated in Comment, Cause to Search and Seize, 26
LA. L. REV. 802 (1966), and by Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HARV. L.
REV. 361 (1927). Fraenkel advocates that because the amendment was drafted in two parts,
the phrase "unreasonable searches" must cover more than the form of the warrant. Another
author contends that although a relationship exists between the sections, they are not
closely tied together. This is indicated by the lack of dependence between the parts of other
amendments in the bill of rights, such as the sixth amendment combination of speedy trial
and impartial jury. Myers, Administrative Inspection of Health Facilities as Unreasonable
Searches, 22 FOOD, DRUG, COSMETiC L.J. 456 (1967).
72. See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 542 (1967).
73. Id. at 545 (emphasis added).
74. But cf. Note, Administrative Search Warrants, 58 MINN. L. REV. 607,611-12 n. 14
(1974), stating that the Supreme Court's current view is that the clauses should be read
interdependently (citing Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973); Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948);
Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699(1948)).
75. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967);
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.76 Similarly, in Katz v.
United States ,7 the Court held that all searches must be reasonable and
those without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. In contrast, the
Court in Terry v. Ohio78 deemed the two clauses independent and posited
different requirements for a reasonable search as compared to a search
based strictly on probable cause. In other cases it found that "[t]he
ultimate standard set forth in the Fourth Amendment is reasonable-
ness. " 
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The question thus remains whether reasonableness is the standard or
whether OSHA is among the valid exceptions to the warrant requirement.
Its treatment by the lower federal courts demonstrates how OSHA fares
under both interpretations.
IV. Fitting OSHA into the Supreme Court Framework: Tripartite Ap-
proach of the Federal Courts
The federal district courts were first confronted with the question of
the validity of unannounced, nonconsensual, 8° warrantless inspections
without probable cause conducted under the authority of OSHA in Bren-
nan v. Buckeye Industries, Inc.81 A Georgia district court found that the
OSHA provisions allowed such inspections and that they were constitu-
tionally permissible. When the statutory provisions were once again
attacked in Brennan v. Gibson's Products, Inc. ,82 a Texas district court
decided differently and declared warrantless searches unconstitutional,
but upheld the constitutionality of the Act by construing the provisions to
contain the restraints of the fourth amendment. Finally, in Barlow's Inc.
v. Usery,83 an Idaho district court declared the Act unconstitutional and
76. 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967).
77. 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) ("searches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated excep-
tions").
78. If this case involved police conduct subject to the Warrant Clause of the
Fourth Amendment, we would have to ascertain whether "probable cause" exist-
ed to justify the search and seizure which took place. . . . Instead the conduct
involved in this case must be tested by the Fourth Amendment's general'proscrip-
tion against unreasonable searches and seizures.
392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
79. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973) (warrantless search of the trunk of
an impounded car); accord, United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950) ("The
relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the
search was reasonable").
80. This comment does not address what constitutes valid consent to an administraw
tive search. See generally United States v. Thriftimart, Inc., 429 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970) (search valid despite lack of warning of right to insist on a
warrant); United States v. Kramer Grocery Co., 418 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1969) (a finding that
consent was coerced was not erroneous); United States v. Hammond Milling Co., 413 F.2d
608 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1002 (1970) (consent found although it was not
actually expressed and despite unawareness of the right to refuse consent).
81. 374 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D. Ga. 1974).
82. 407 F. Supp. 154 (E.D. Tex. 1976).
83. 424 F. Supp. 437 (D. Idaho 1976), prob. juris. noted sub nor. Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc., 430 U.S. 964 (1977).
refused to interpret the Act to contain fourth amendment restrictions.
Thus, three positions had been advanced, but no definitive position
emerged until the Supreme Court decided Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. 83a
This and other recent decisions on the subject of administrative searches
render the rationale of Buckeye suspect.
A. Brennan v. Buckeye Industries, Inc.: Marching to the Beat of a
Nonexistent Drum
In Buckeye, the majority concluded that the appellant corporation
was "constitutionally speaking, marching to the beat of an antique
drum"84 by contending that a warrant was required before an OSHA
inspector could make a routine inspection of premises used in manufac-
turing clothing. 85 The district court's analysis focused on cases dealing
with regulatory searches, notably Colonnade and Biswell, and the lower
courts' application of the rationale of these cases to uphold warrantless
searches under statutes regulating coal mines
86 and pharmacy records. 87
From these cases, the court in Buckeye discerned an apparent trend
limiting the holdings of Camara and See to cases in which the statutory
grant of authority to inspect is expansive and not given in conjunction
with intensive regulatory powers.8 8 Rather than drawing any similarities
or distinctions between inspections pursuant to other statutory authority
and the OSHA inspections, the court relied entirely on what it considered
a firmly established trend upholding warrantless searches.
89
This reliance was misplaced. Buckeye was decided before Almeida-
Sanchez, in which such a trend was disclaimed by the Supreme Court or
at least strictly limited. 90 The Biswell exception has been confined to
situations in which the government has historic broad authority to regu-
late, and any attempt to expand its applicability should be analyzed
cautiously. 91 In the absence of such a trend, it is necessary to scrutinize
83a. 46 U.S.L.W. 4483 (1978).
84. 374 F. Supp. 1350, 1356 (S.D. Ga. 1974).
85. The court also asserted without further explanation that a probable cause standard
would defeat the act's purpose because it would require an employee to report a violation
before an investigation could be made and corrective action begun. Id. at 1354. There is no
reasoh the court should assume this requirement since Camara stated that the same
standards of probable cause need.not be applied in issuing an administrative warrant. The
district court's opinion seems to equate the probable cause requirements of criminal and
civil warrants. For a discussion of the lesser standards that have been held applicable to
administrative searches, see notes 186-88 infra and accompanying text.
86. Youghiogheny &, Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
87. Terraciano v. Montanye, 493 F.2d 682 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974).
88. 374 F. Supp. 1350, 1355-56 (1974).
89. The Buckeye holding that a warrant is unnecessary for an OSHA inspection
recently received support in Usery v. Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc., 5 OSHC 1617
(E.D.N.Y. 1977) (the support was in dictum since the OSHA inspection was conducted
under authority of a warrant), and Dunlop v. Able Contractors, Inc., 4 OSHC 1110 (D.
Mont. 1975) aff'd, 6 OSHC 1317 (9th Cir. 1978) (petition to inspect was granted but the judge
remarked that the position of the Secretary of Labor is "very distasteful").
90. See text discussion of Almeida-Sanchez and G.M. Leasing Corp. at notes 60-69
supra.
91. Lake Butler Apparel Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 519 F.2d 84, 88 (5th Cir. 1975)
carefully fourth amendment interpretations and to compare closely stat-
utes and circumstances that lead to findings of reasonableness upholding
warrantless searches in other contexts. This method will yield a well-
reasoned determination of whether a warrant is required.
B. Brennan v. Gibson's Products, Inc. and Progeny: OSHA Searches
are Constitutional
I. The Expectation of Privacy in a Commercial Establishment.-
The reasonableness of a search depends on the legitimacy of the privacy
interest at stake. 92 Hence, it is not the ownership of the premises, but his
privacy interests, that will accord the proprietor fourth amendment pro-
tection.9 3 The Supreme Court has frequently intimated that the privacy
interest in commercial premises may be more limited than the privacy
interest in a residence.
94
(a) The extent of regulation as reducing reasonable expectation.-It
has been argued that the extent of regulation over the commercial ac-
tivities should be an indicium to any justifiable expectation of privacy in
the premises. The theory is that in a regulated activity the search can
arguably be anticipated through knowledge of the regulations, and,
hence, reasonable expectations of privacy are limited.95
The Supreme Court has stated that when an intrusion on a business is
"not based upon the nature of its business, its license, or any regulation
of its activities [there is] no justification for treating petitioner differently
in these circumstances simply because it is a corporation." 9 6 It has been
argued that since all persons engaging in a business affecting commerce
who have employees are regulated by OSHA, their privacy interests are
limited accordingly. 97 When regulation has been the basis of finding
limited privacy expectations, however, it has generally been required that
the regulation be "pervasive'' 98 or that the business have a history of
(court did not reach fourth amendment issues of a warrantless OSHA search because it
found consent).
92. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977) (warrant required before a locked
footlocker could be searched); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("For the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places").
93. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
94. G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 353 (1977) ("a business by its
special nature and voluntary existence may open itself to intrusions that would not be
permissible in a purely private context"); See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 546 (1967) ("We do
not in any way imply that business premises may not reasonably be inspected in many more
situations than private homes"); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950)
("corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to
privacy").
95. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972); Dunlop v. Hertzler Enter-
prises, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 627, 631-32 (D.N.M. 1976). See United States v. Litvin, 353 F.
Supp. 1333, 1336 (D.D.C. 1973).
96. G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 354 (1977) (emphasis added).
97. Brief for the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae at 9-10, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., prob.
juris. noted 430 U.S. 964 (1977).
98. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972). The pervasiveness of the
regulation. 99 The enterprises OSHA seeks to inspect are often not en-
gaged in a pervasively regulated business because the Act covers every
type of business.
100
The expectation of privacy is not limited by the existence of any
regulation; otherwise few areas would remain where an expectation of
privacy justifiably could be maintained, since even a home is subject to
health and safety regulation. Furthermore, advance notice could be used
prospectively to make any search constitutional, and all fourth amend-
ment protections would be removed. Government regulation should not
be permitted to remove a person's privacy expectations.' 0 '
(b) Public nature of worksite as reducing privacy expectations. -The
public nature of the worksite, 10 2 an area commonly subject to OSHA
inspections, calls into question the reasonableness of expectations of
privacy. This is an important distinction between OSHA inspections and
many other administrative searches. Yet, it has been virtually ignored by
the courts. In one case, Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton,
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the court invoked this line of inquiry in examining the Coal Mines Health
and Safety Act,1° 4 which authorizes warrantless searches. It found that
the right of privacy had been waived because operation of the business
required the daily influx of large numbers of miners. This opened the
mine to "representatives of the public and the public has every right to
ensure that the working condition of these same mines meet certain safety
standards."' 105 What is knowingly exposed to the public, even in a home
or office, is not subject to fourth amendment protection.l16
regulation is an important consideration because it is an extension of the implied consent
theory derived from licensing requirements. See note 54 and accompanying text supra. The
regulation must be sufficiently pervasive to imply awareness of its existence, acceptance of
its inspection provisions, and the burdens resulting from its acceptance.
99. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970).
100. Dunlop v. Hertzler Enterprises, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 627 (D.N.M. 1976) (inspection
of a manufacturer of ammunition and paper boxes); Brennan v. Gibson's Products, Inc., 407
F. Supp. 154 (E.D. Tex. 1976) (inspection of a discount house).
101. But cf. People v. Mason, 5 Cal. 3d 759, 488 P.2d 630, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1016 (1972) (no expectation of privacy when probation terms stipulate
warrantless searches are permissible at any time); Wilson v. Commonwealth, 475 S.W.2d
895 (Ky. 1971) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in a police locker when the right of the
department to inspect the locker has been explained previously); State v. Bryant, 287 Minn.
205, 177 N.W.2d 800 (1970) (no expectation of privacy in enclosures of public restroom
because of signs warning of surveillance). See generally Greenberg, supra note 40; Note,
Katz and the Fourth Amendment: A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy or, A Man's Home
is his Fort, 23 CLFV. ST. L. REV. 63 (1974). It is questionable, though, how much notice of
OSHA inspections is provided when enforcement is widely scattered because the agency's
inspectors can visit only 3-5% of the workplaces covered by the Act. [1977 Current Reports]
6 Occup. HEALTH & SAFETY REP. (BNA) 1323.
102. The public nature results from the influx of employees and outside parties
delivering materials.
103. 364 F. Supp. 45 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
104. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-960 (1970).
105. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45, 50-51 (S.D. Ohio
1973).
106. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
The flaw in this analysis lies in equating exposure to employees with
exposure to the public. Although Youghiogheny contemplated a business
with many employees,"'l OSHA inspections can extend to the employer
with only two employees. 10 8 In these cases, the employer is hardly
opening his doors to the public. His subjective expectations of privacy are
likely to be affected significantly, and satisfaction of the objective test of
the reasonableness of the expectation is much easier to envision.
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The Supreme Court has, however, found justifiable expectations of
privacy in situations in which the area was accessible to the public. 10
Mancusi v. DeFortel l reached this conclusion about papers that were
kept in an office shared with other employees who could have examined
the documents. The Court said that, in contrast to the situation in which
the area is entirely open to the public, the expectation can be maintained
when one can expect a limited number of people and their personal guests
to enter.' 12 The Court found it irrelevant that some of these people could
have validly consented to a search of the office. 1 3 Thus, it is insignificant
that the employees in a business could have filed a complaint for any
witnessed violations; the inspector would still be intruding on a privacy
interest.
The inspection of a business establishment, even if considered a
public place with public entry, may still require a warrant because the
intent is not merely to enter but to inspect. Entry allows only a superficial
observance of what is in plain view, while inspection entails a much more
detailed observance of conditions. 11 4 Furthermore, although private citi-
zens may have entry, the fourth amendment does not limit their actions,
but prohibits governmental intrusions.
By analogy to labor organization and collective bargaining cases that
give employees' representatives some right to use the employer's proper-
ty against his objection,"' it has been argued that an owner who opens his
107. 364 F. Supp. 45, 51 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
108. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 3(5), 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (1970).
109. The "reasonable expectation" standard is an abstract standard that is essentially
a matter of degree. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), abandoned the idea of
constitutionally protected areas in favor of a subjective emphasis-a finding of reliance on
privacy. Application of this subjective standard is difficult because it focuses on the
expectations of a particular party, which can often only be surmised.
110. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968) (justifiable expectation of privacy in an
office shared with other employees); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)(justifiable
expectation of privacy in a public telephone booth).
111. 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
112. Id. at 369.
113. Id. at 369-70. The Court, in making the determination of fourth amendment
rights, focused on finding a reliance on privacy and finding the reliance justifiable.
114. OSHA inspections may include the performance of tests to measure compliance
with the standards, the collection of field samples, or the procurement of witness' tes-
timony. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 657(b) (1970); [1977
Reference binder] 2 Occup. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 77:2507 (OSHA Field Operation
Manual); id. at 77:8004 (Industrial Hygiene Manual, formerly part of the OSHA Field
Operation Manual).
115. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956) (union organizers who
property by hiring employees necessarily dilutes his right to control entry
absolutely when the protection of the employees is at issue. 116 The same
argument follows from Wyman,' 17 in which the warrantless entry was
found reasonable because of the public interest in the protection of the
child. Similarly, an OSHA inspection does not involve the stigma of the
arrival of uniformed police. The inspector is plain-clothed, and his
routine arrival carries no inference that a crime has been committed.
OSHA also seeks to foster a working relationship with the employee
representative. 
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The similarity ends at this point. Entrance by a union representative
centers on making contact with the employee. The caseworker's entry
focuses on the dependent child, not the mother who asserts the privacy
interest. "The caseworker is not a sleuth but rather, we trust, is a friend to
one in need." ' 19 The same can hardly be said of the OSHA inspector
whose purpose is to seek out and discover violations. Unlike Wyman, the
penalties involved are not just the loss of a government benefit or even the
imposition of a civil fine that could monetarily equal the lost benefit.
Rather, the employer could be subject to imprisonment.1
20
The privacy interest of an owner of business premises can also be
compared with that of a landlord in the common areas of a residential
building. It has been suggested that a search of these common areas
would not threaten personal privacy, but would intrude only on a techni-
cal property interest arising from legal possession. 12' The analysis can be
extended to areas open for commercial purposes, such as restaurants and
theaters. 122 The "public" access, however, especially in small busi-
nesses, may be limited to two employees, which is hardly comparable to
the flow of people in a theater or an apartment building. In addition,
businesses have private aspects related to the type or method of work
conducted that the owner may seek to keep private through various types
of security arrangements. ' 23 The consequences of an invasion of privacy
seek to solicit for union membership may intrude on an employer's private property if no
other means exist for communicating with the employees). Cf. Republic Aviation Corp. v.
NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798, 802 n.8 (1945) (balancing conflicting interests of employees to
receive information on self-organization on company property from fellow employees
during non-working time and employer's right to control the use of his property resulted in
finding the employees' interest more important).
116. Brief for the Appellants at 30, Brief for the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae at 10,
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., prob. juris. noted 430 U.S. 964 (1977).
117. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
118. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 657(e) (1970) (a
representative of the employer and a representative authorized by the employees have the
opportunity to accompany the OSHA inspector during the inspection.
119. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 323 (1971).
120. See notes 17-20 and accompanying text supra.
121. Comment, The Fourth Amendment and Housing Inspections, 77 YALE L.J. 521,
539-40 (1970).
122. Brief for the AFL-CIO As Amicus Curiae at 11, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., prob.
juris. noted 430 U.S. 964 (1977).
123. The Act itself recognizes the particular privacy interests that are likely to reside
in a business by seeking to protect trade secrets from exposure, but considering the
are likely to be more harmful to the business than the harm that could
result from an entry into an open hallway.
The Supreme Court has noted that what a person "seeks to preserve
as private even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected."'-24 An actual subjective expectation of privacy in a business
premise and a privacy interest that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable have been and should be recognized by the courts.125
2. Limitations on Inspection Imposed by the Act.-Since it is
possible to maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in business
premises, the statutorily imposed OSHA restrictions on the power to
inspect must be examined to determine if the extent of the intrusion is
sufficiently limited for the search to remain reasonable. When privacy
interests are compromised by a search, the statute authorizing it must be
limited in time, place, and scope to protect as much of the constitutional
privilege as possible.
The provisions of OSHA specify that investigations must take place
during regular working hours and at other reasonable times, within
reasonable limits, and in a reasonable manner. 126 Inspection may be made
only in areas where work is performed by an employee and is limited to
conditions, equipment, and materials in the work place.' 27 The inspector
is required to outline to the employer the scope of the inspection 128 to
inform him of its limits.
Some decisions indicate that these provisions are not sufficiently
limiting to make searches authorized by the regulation reasonable.' 29 In
Brennan v. Gibson's Products, Inc. ,130 a compliance officer wanted to
inspect the nonpublic portions of a store, but the court held a warrantless
search would be unreasonable. One of the court's pivotal determinations
was that the statute is too broad to be construed as a general exception to
the warrant requirement. OSHA's sweep extends to every private concern
in a business affecting commerce. It embraces indiscriminately an entire
range of unrelated businesses. In contrast, other statutory inspection
schemes focus on a particular industry or item that is inherently danger-
ous,131 and, thus, sharply limit and define the scope of any inspection.
difficulty of enforcement, a warrant would add substantially to this protection. Occupation-
al Health and Safety Act of 1970, § 15, 29 U.S.C. § 664 (1970).
124. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
125. Alaska Truss & Millwork v. State, 5 OSHC 1530 (Alaska 1977).
126. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 657(a)(2) (1970),
quoted in text at note 16 supra.
127. Id. at § 657(a)(1).
128. [1977 Reference Binder] 2 Occup. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 77:2504
(OSHA Field Operations Manual).
129. Brennan v. Gibson's Products, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 154 (E.D. Tex. 1976); Dunlop
v. Hertzler Enterprises, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 627 (D.N.M. 1976).
130. 407 F. Supp. 154 (E.D. Tex. 1976).
131. Toxic Substances Control Act, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 2610 (Cum. Supp. 1977); 21
U.S.C. § 603 (1970) (Secretary of Agriculture's inspection of meat and meat products); Egg
fn Dunlop v. Hertzler Enterprises, Inc. ,132 the court followed the
reasoning in Gibson to find a warrantless OSHA inspection unconstitu-
tional and noted that the limited scope of other regulations provides some
certainty that the sites being searched have items of government concern
that are the subject of regulation. There is no certainty, however, that the
hazardous working conditions that OSHA seeks to control are present. 
133
The Gibson court suggested that had there been a finding by Congress
34
that the working. conditions subject to regulation exist in most enterprises
covered by OSHA it "might throw a different light on the subject.'1
35
Instead, the findings on which the Act is premised are general and
"obvious," 136 in contrast with the bases for other acts in which a warrant
exception has been found.137
OSHA, therefore, is more similar to the expansive grants of inves-
tigative authority discussed in Camara than to the narrowly confined gun
control statute in Biswell. In OSHA, there is little restriction on the area
of search.138 The subjects of inspection are also not particular and lim-
ited, but are broadly defined and cover a wide expanse of possibilities. 139
Gibson also analogized OSHA to the broad discretionary powers of
the compliance officer of the roving border patrol in Almeida-Sanchez.
As in Camara, the court found an unfettered discretion, but this criticism
is overemphasized. The decision to inspect a particular location is limited
by enumerated standards, and the decision falls on the superiors of the
field officer. I4I As in the enforcement of criminal law,"'4 some discretion
Products Inspection Act, §§ 5(a), 5(b), 5(d), 21 U.S.C. §§ 1034(a), 1034(b), 1034(d) (1970);
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, § 103, 30 U.S.C. § 813 (1970); Federal Aviation Act, §
605(b), 49 U.S.C. § 1425(b) (1970).
132. 418 F. Supp. 627 (D.N.M. 1976).
133. Id. at 633.
134. The court, however, expressed its doubts that such a finding could have been
made. 407 F. Supp. 154, 162 (1976).
135. Id. This indicates the court might be willing to sustain these searches had
Congress made this finding, because more weight would be given to the public interest in the
balance against individual privacy interests.
136. Id. at 161.
137. The finding on which Congress based OSHA is summarized by the Gibson court
in the following manner: "work, injuries and illnesses burden commerce substantially in
various evident ways." Id. This finding is contrasted with that of the Coal Mines Health and
Safety Act, §§ 2-513, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-960 (1970), which the court has found detailed and
specific.
138. This results because in many businesses the entire building will be subject to
access by some employee and the power to inspect extends to any "environment where
work is performed by an employee." Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 8(a)(1),
29 U.S.C. § 657(a)(1) (1970) (quoted in text at note 16 supra).
139. The inspection provisions speak in terms of subjecting "pertinent conditions,"
"structures," and "apparatus" to inspection. Id. § 657(a)(2).
140. The decision falls on the Area Director. Even at this level, unlimited discretion
would be worrisome to the courts. See notes 63-69 and accompanying text supra. The Area
Director's discretion, however, is narrowed by standards provided in the Field Operations
Manual that determine coverage according to injury and illness statistics of different
industries. [1977 Reference Binder] 2 Occup. SAFETY & HEALTH . REP. (BNA) 77:2301,
77:2302 (OSHA Field Operations Manual).
141. The police officer has considerable discretion to choose the suspect who will be
the subject of investigation. Once the suspect is chosen, however, certain requirements,
such as the acquisition of a warrant, must be met before investigation.
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is necessary when the manpower devoted to enforcement of the Act is
limited and not all places can be inspected. 1
42
Even conceding that the authorization to inspect is circumscribed by
safeguards and a strong government interest is served, it cannot be
assumed, on this basis alone, that warrantless searches conducted in
accordance with these standards are constitutionally permissible. The
reasonableness of the search is still dependent on the extent of the
intrusion on the individual's privacy.' 4 3 The ordinance in Camara pro-
vided that the inspection could be conducted only at reasonable times and
only on a display of credentials similar to those required by OSHA, but a
warrant was deemed essential when a significant intrusion on privacy
interests is likely.
3. Significance of a Warrant Requirement.-A warrant is vital
even though the statute is limited because it offers safeguards that the
statute cannot. First, it subjects the inspection decision to review by a
magistrate who is unaffected by competitive pressures.'" Camara sug-
gests that it is unnecessary for the magistrate to reassess the basic agency
decision to inspect a particular area. The purpose of the warrant is
fulfilled simply by examining the particular place to see that it has been
chosen in accordance with articulated agency guidelines. This review will
limit the harassment that could easily occur through overzealous enforce-
ment. OSHA was enacted because many employers simply could not
make the necessary investment in health and safety and could not survive
competitively, unless every employer were so compelled. 145 Selective
nonenforcement could drive numerous concerns out of business. 1
46
Second, a warrant would limit the use of the administrative search as
a fishing expedition to gather evidence of other crimes. 147 There may still
142. The Act covers nearly 65 million workers in approximately 5 million workplaces,
and the Secretary of Labor conducts more than 80,000 inspections yearly with only 1,300
inspectors. Brief for the Appellants at 40, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., prob. juris. noted 430
U.S. 964 (1977).
143. See notes 92-93 and accompanying text supra.
144. "In their understandable zeal to ferret out crime and in the excitement of the
capture of a suspected person, officers are less likely (than judges] to possess the detach-
ment and neutrality with which the constitutional rights of the suspect must be viewed.-
Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948).
145. S. REP. No. 91-1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CoDE CONG.
& AD. NEws 5177, 5180.
146. LaFave, supra note 7, suggests the warrant would not limit abuse of inspection
for harassment purposes because it is unlikely that motives of spite would come to the
magistrate's attention. Under the proposed probable cause standards, however, the motives
would only be hidden during the first inspection. The frequency of subsequent inspections
would alert the magistrate.
147. Recently, the IRS has come under attack for using this type of operation. The
Service has instituted a new audit technique known as the "eleven questions" procedure.
The procedure provides for eleven spectific questions about political campaign contribu-
tions; corporate slush funds used for bribery, lobbying, kickbacks, and diversion to personal
use; and payments to foreign government officials in return for favorable business conces-
sions from corporate officials, key employees, and the audit partner of the accounting firm.
Strong reactions have resulted from the fear that disclosures will be made to the SEC and
be some temptation to gain access through the administrative warrant,
since the standards for acquiring such a warrant are different from the
probable cause requirement of criminal warrants,' but certainly the
temptation is lessened when the search is subject to review.
149
Last, the warrant serves both as a record that may facilitate later
judicial review 150 and as a psychological restraint on the inspector
conducting the inspection because of the need to return the warrant to the
court. This may engender a self-imposed sense of caution.' 5 '
Broad statutory safeguards cannot substitute for individualized re-
view. 152 A warrant requirement would do more than "simply track the
statute,"' 153 since the person who was the object of the search would
receive more protection than he already had under the statute. A very
limited statute should not be grounds for finding a search reasonable;
otherwise, carefully drafted statutes could open up every area to warrant-
less searches. 154
4. The Government Need for Warrantless Inspection.-The deter-
mination of whether there is an expectation of privacy and the limitations
imposed on a search by the applicable statute establish the extent of the
invasion, which, in turn, must be balanced against the need for the search
to assess its reasonableness. Encroachment on a personal liberty must be
viewed in light of less drastic means of achieving the same purpose:
"[T]he [Government] may prevail only upon showing a subordinating
interest which is compelling [citations omitted]. The law must be shown
,necessary' and not merely rationally related to the accomplishment of a
permissible [Government] policy.'1
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(a) Critical need for surprise. -Congress, in enacting OSHA, clearly
indicated that surprise is critical to effective enforcement of the statute. 156
The importance of surprise has also been recognized by the courts and
other governmental agencies. See Simmons, The "Eleven Questions" - An Extraordinary
New Audit Technique, 30 TAX LAW. 23 (1976).
148. See notes 184-90 and accompanying text infra.
149. It has been asserted that there has never been a situation in which information
obtained by an OSHA inspector has been given to other enforcement officials to use. Brief
for the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae at 16 n. 12, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., prob. furis, noted
430 U.S. 964 (1977), but such a situation could arise. If a warrant is obtained and used as a
tool for another agency, the evidence would be inadmissible. This however, requires a
determination of the OSHA officer's motive in obtaining the warrant. Good faith is the test
applied by the Court, and this is difficult to disprove. See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S.
217 (1960).
150. Greenberg, supra note 40.
151. Sonnenreich & Pinco, supra note 7.
152. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967).
153. Terraciano v. Montanye, 493 F.2d 682 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974).
154. Comment, Administrative Searches and The Implied Consent Doctrine: Beyond
the Fourth Amendment, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 91, 122 (1976).
155. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
156. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 17(f), 29 U.S.C. § 666(f) (1970)
(punishment may be imposed up to a $1,000 fine or 6 months imprisonment).
may support the reasonableness of issuing a warrant in advance.t5 7 The
need for surprise in an OSHA inspection rests on grounds similar to those
articulated in Biswell and Colonnade. In those cases, warrantless
searches were upheld in part because of the nature of the goods. 58 Guns
and liquor are both easily concealable and portable, and surprise may be
essential to prevent their destruction or removal. Some hazardous work-
ing conditions can also be concealed easily,' 59 and, thus, it is arguable
that a warrantless search is necessary to avoid frustrating the purpose of
the statute.
Nevertheless, surprise need not be forfeited because of a warrant
requirement. See suggested warrants could be routinely obtained ex parte
in advance of the inspection. "° This would not unduly burden the
Secretary of Labor or the courts. Many warrantless inspections are
conducted on the basis of consent, and the addition of a warrant require-
ment is unlikely to lower significantly the number of consent searches.
Unlike a scheme of regulation that completely lacks a warrant procedure
to compel inspection after refusal, the employer would know that the
inspector will return immediately after obtaining a warrant. Few employ-
ers will invite administrative displeasure by refusing consent when there
is a substantial likelihood that some violation can always be uncovered in
light of the multitude of applicable standards.
161
If the Secretary of Labor does not wish to risk advance notice by
seeking consent before obtaining a warrant, a quantity of warrants could
be obtained in advance to reduce the burden of a separate hearing for each
warrant. Routine inspection decisions are made and scheduled before the
date of inspection' 62 on the basis of information that is regularly collected
by the Secretary. 63 A warrant will issue upon a showing by affidavit of
compliance with the applicable standards for inspection.
(b) Availability of alternative methods to achieve compliance.-One
district court has implied that inspections are not absolutely essential to
the OSHA program because less intrusive and oppressive methods of
157. See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 n.6 (1967).
158. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311,316 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp. v.
United States, 397 U.S. 72, 75-76 (1970).
159. Two examples of easily correctable conditions that could subject employers to
fines are ventilating fans clogged with residue that can easily be removed for the inspection
and then quickly allowed to deteriorate and safety devices such as hard hats, earplugs, and
safety belts that employees might be required to wear only for the inspection. See, e.g.,
Brief for the Appellants at 39 n.20, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., prob. juris. noted 430 U.S.
964 (1977).
160. Language in Camara suggests that warrants should normally be sought only after
entry is refused, 387 U.S. 523, 539-40 (1967). If this would seriously impede the efficacy of
an inspection scheme, exceptions will probably be made according to the nature of the
regulation. See See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 n.6 (1967).
161. See generally Occupational Safety and Health Standards, 29 C.F.R. § 1910
(1976).
162. [1977 Reference binder] 2 Occup. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 77:2301, 2501
(OSHA Field Operations Manual).
163. See id. at 77:3901-02.
obtaining compliance are available.t 64 These include employer reporting
requirements that provide for employee contribution and participation,
employer-employee safety committees,1 65 encouragement of employee
complaints,166 a greater input by labor unions as the safety representatives
of their members, and efforts toward better enforcement of state health
and safety laws.'
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The effectiveness of these methods, however, is seriously open to
question. Assuming that the basis of some of the suggestions is true-that
both employers and employees have a large enough stake in safety to
lodge complaints and thereby initiate the inspection procedures-
nevertheless, many of the hazards regulated by OSHA cannot readily be
discovered by nontechnical workers. Therefore, only the most blatant
violations would be subject to discovery. 168 Collective bargaining by
unions to impose better safety measures has resulted, for the most part, in
only temporary improvements. 169 Cost-conscious companies have tended
to restrict the unions' effectiveness. Even if unions have made significant
gains, these advances are confined to the organized sector of business,
which excludes a large proportion of the total workforce.1
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Although the need for OSHA inspections is evident, the need for
warrantless inspections is not. If the extent of the intrusion on demon-
strably justifiable expectations of privacy were balanced against this latter
"need," warrantless OSHA inspections would be found unreasonable.
[I]nroads on fourth amendment safeguards, wrought in the
name of administrative expedience and weighty governmental
interest, are to be viewed with no greater favor now than at the
time of See and Camara. However where the inroad is narrow,
supported by specific and clear congressional findings, and the
object or practice to be regulated is inherently dangerous and
(perhaps or) traditionally regulated as in Colonnade and Bis-
well, it is more likely to be tolerated.'
71
Because these mitigating circumstances do not exist in OSHA inspec-
tions, a showing sufficient to establish probable cause and justify the
issuance of a warrant is necessary to protect the fourth amendment rights
at stake.' 
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164. Barlow's, Inc. v. Usery, 424 F. Supp. 437, 441 n.4 (D. Idaho 1976), prob. juris.
noted sub nom. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 430 U.S. 964 (1977).
165. 116 CONG. REC. 38393 (1970) (remarks of Representative Michel).
166. The Fair Labor Standards Act, §§ 1-19, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970), has success-
fully used the method of employer or employee complaints. Once the complaint is received,
the inspector obtains a warrant before making an inspection. See Comment, OSHA: Em-
ployer Beware, 10 Hous. L. REv. 426, 428 (1973).
167. Barlow's, Inc. v. Usery, 424 F. Supp. 437, 441 n.4 (D. Idaho 1976), prob. juris.
noted sub nor. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 430 U.S. 964 (1977).
168. Brief Amicus Curiae of Sierra Club; Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Interna-
tional Union; and Friends of the Earth in Support of Appellants at 11-12, Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc., prob. juris. noted 430 U.S. 964 (1977).
169. 116 CONG. REC. 38392 (1970) (remarks of Representative Karth).
170. Cohen, The Occupational, Safety and Health Act: A Labor Lawyer's Overview,
33 OHIo ST. L.J. 788, 789 (1972).
171. Brennan v. Gibson's Products, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 154, 161 (E.D. Tex. 1976).
172. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 18(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 667(c)(2)
5. Probable Cause Necessary for Issuance of an OSHA Inspection
Warrant.-OSHA investigations and inspections are conducted on a
priority basis. Highest priority is accorded investigations of imminent
danger. Second in importance are investigations of catastrophes and
fatalities. Third are investigations of employee complaints. Investigations
of target industries rank fourth and random inspections are last in priori-
ty. 7 3 Since each type of inspection is initiated by a different set of
circumstances, the probable cause standard for each classification should
be examined separately.
(a) Imminent danger.-Imminent danger is defined by the Act to in-
clude conditions or practices in any place of employment causing a
danger that could reasonably be expected to cause death or serious
physical harm either immediately or before the imminence of the danger
can be eliminated. 174 These circumstances justify removing the warrant
requirement under the emergency doctrine. 175 The exception operates
when there is a showing of true necessity-a substantial threat to life,
health, or property176-that commands immediate action. The impor-
tance of immediately eliminating the hazard is acknowledged by the
authorization of advance notice of inspection under these circum-
stances, 77 which results in forfeiting surprise in favor of expediting the
elimination of the hazard. Thus, inquiries into the existence of probable
cause will not be necessary for imminent danger situations.
(b) Catastrophe and fatality investigations.-The probable cause re-
quirement for job-related catastrophe and fatality investigations need not
(1970), allows the states to exercise jurisdiction over occupational safety and health under
approved state plans with standards that are at least as effective in providing a safe
workplace as the standards promulgated under the federal act. Twenty-three states have
enacted state acts to supplement the federal act. Recently, the inspection provisions of these
plans have been subjected to constitutional attack and provisions for warrantless inspec-
tions have been found to violate the fourth amendment in a number of cases. Alaska Truss
& Millwork v. State, 5 OSHA 1530 (Alaska 1977) (pervasiveness of Alaska OSHA noted
with conclusion that the burden of obtaining a warrant is not likely to frustrate the inspec-
tion); Yocom v. Burnette Tractor Co., 5 OSHA 1465 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (in absence of a
showing that the business is inherently dangerous or subject to federal or state regulation or
pervasive regulation, inspection of closed areas of premises under state OSHA not permitt-
ed without a warrant); Baird v. Utah, 1976-77 OSHD 25,829 (state circuit court judge held
Gibson's dispositive in finding Oregon OSHA unconstitutional); People v. Salwasser,
[Current Reports] 6 OccuP. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 1387 (1977) (municipal court
judge found that California OSHA violated the fourth amendment); State v. Albuquerque
Publishing Co., [Current Reports) 6 Occup. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) - (1976) (New
Mexico OSHA held unconstitutional under the fourth amendment by state district court
judge).
173. [1977 Reference Binder] 2 Occur'. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 77:2301
(OSHA Field Operations Manual); Heath, The Implementation and Philosophy of the Wil-
liams-Steiger Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 249, 254
(1973).
174. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 13(a), 29 U.S.C. 662(a) (1970).
175. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970).
176. People v. Smith, 7 Cal. 3d 282, 496 P.2d 1261, 101 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1972).
177. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.6 (1976).
differ significantly from traditional probable cause standards. 78 The
occurrence of the catastrophe or fatality is sufficient to establish the belief
that a violation of the OSHA standards has probably occurred in the area
to be searched.
(c) Employee complaints.-Employee complaints should be subjected
to a rigorous probable cause determination equivalent to criminal prob-
able cause tests, since they present the greatest potential for harassment.
The focus is on the individual employer rather than every business in a
certain activity, and the investigation mechanism is activated by human
action rather than by the occurrence of a particular event, which raises the
possibility of abuse. The inspection is closely related to a criminal
investigation because it is initiated by the victim's complaint and atten-
tion is drawn to a particular employer and "crime." Hence more protec-
tion should be granted. 1
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(d) Target industry investigations.-Target industries constitute the
third classification to which traditional principles of probable cause can
appropriately be applied. Target industries are those industries that have
been selected through comparisons of incident rates' 8° and are associated
with a higher risk of accident.''
These industry-wide statistics, however, are insufficient to show
probable cause to justify a particular compliance inspection. 82 The Court
in Camara suggested that it is unnecessary, when health and safety are
involved, to show detailed information about the premises or a probabili-
ty that violations might exist because the search might be frustrated. This
conclusion results because housing violations often cannot be spotted
from outside the premises and, therefore, are not conducive to a probable
cause determination that a violation is likely to exist. For target indus-
tries, individual information is available and the particular incident rate of
each plant can be obtained'8 3 to show the likelihood of finding a violation
within the commercial establishment.
178. See note 35 supra.
179. In United States v. Anile, 352 F. Supp. 14 (N.D. W. Va. 1973), evidence obtained
in a warrantless inspection of a pharmacy under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
was suppressed primarily because it was a nonroutine inspection in which attention focused
on the employer. Although a stronger showing of probable cause is desirable for employee
complaint inspections, it does not necessarily follow that the warrant will be as limited in
scope as a criminal warrant. Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co., 5 OSHC 1375 (N.D. I11. 1977)
(warrant issuing on grounds of employee complaint found not overbroad for authorizing
reasonable inspection of entire premises including areas not related to the matter in the
complaint).
180. Marshall v. Shellcast Corp., 5 OSHC 1689, 1690 (N.D. Ala. 1977) (OSHA
warrant quashed for lack of probable cause), defines the incident rate as the ratio of the
number of reported injuries and illnesses from occupational reasons to the number of hours
worked in a year, multiplied by an index factor.
181. Examples include construction, transportation, and petro-chemicals. [Current
Reports] 6 OccuP. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 1587.
182. Id. at 1691.
183. "OSHA or other similarly situated organizations cannot close their eyes to the
individual sutuation, relying on some national accumulated group of statistics.'" Id.
(e) Periodic routine inspections.-Requiring a high standard of indi-
vidualized cause for routine inspections could defeat the purpose of the
statute because of the difficulty of satisfying this standard. A warrant
requirement that entails a lesser standard of probable cause than in the
criminal context could, however, be imposed. 8 4 A more flexible prob-
able cause requirement is justified by the nature of the search and the
method of conducting it. An OSHA inspection is not intended to uncover
evidence of a crime, but to compel compliance. Like a stop and frisk, an
OSHA search is a lesser imposition than a full-fledged search for criminal
evidence, and should, therefore, require a lesser probable cause show-
ing.185 Furthermore, a police search could damage one's reputation be-
cause it suggests official suspicion of the commission of a crime. No such
inference arises from a routine OSHA inspection because no particular
individual is the subject of inquiry.
The Camara court, in treating a similar matter of area code enforce-
ment, deemed that probable cause would be found if it could be shown
that
reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conduct-
ing an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular
dwelling. Such standards, which will vary with the municipal
program being enforced, may be based upon the passage of
time, the nature of the building . . . , or the condition of the
entire area, but they will not necessarily depend upon specific
knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling.
18 6
The lower federal courts have had occasion to review warrants
issued under statutes requiring conformance to the Camara standards.
187
The inquiry in most instances has been directed to the frequency of the
inspection and a showing of a strong public interest. The latter require-
ment, however, has often been implicitly satisfied by the fact of the
enactment of the statute, and it then becomes a valid public interest to
insure compliance with the statutory requirements. 1
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Emphasis on the frequency of inspections serves to prevent harass-
ment resulting from overzealous enforcement. When a predetermined
number of inspections have been conducted without the discovery of
violations, the searches should not be permitted to continue on unsupport-
184. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967).
185. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1967).
186. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967).
187. See cases cited in note 188 infra.
188. United States v. Goldfine, 538 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1976) (a finding that the purpose
of the inspection is to insure compliance and that the premises had not been inspected
previously was sufficient to show probable cause); United States v. Blanchard, 495 F.2d
1329 (1st Cir. 1974) (personal examination by an agent revealing a violation and lack of
inspection of the premises within the past year established probable cause); United States v.
Greenberg, 334 F. Supp. 364 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (inspection pursuant to the Federal Compre-
hensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, which defines probable cause as a valid
public interest in the effective enforcement of the Act, upheld because a substantial period
of time had elapsed since the last inspection).
ed speculation that a violation may have been hidden.18 9 Rather, a
rebuttable presumption of legality should result. 190 If facts supporting the
suspicion are uncovered, but no violation is found, the evidence will
support the issuance of a new particularized warrant. This grants the
employer, who is subject to a search that can no longer be termed routine,
the added protection of a particularized warrant.
The use of a flexible standard of probable cause has led some critics
to designate administrative warrants as "synthetic search warrants,"' 9' a
magistrate's rubber stamp of the agency decision. Simply because a
warrant issues routinely, however, does not mean the requirement should
be discarded. The solution lies in adjusting the procedure used in issuing
the warrants. Although a relaxed standard of probable cause in one area
112might be carried over into other areas where it would be inappropriate,
this does not justify rejection of the use of warrants. Magistrates can
distinguish the proper situations for application of the relaxed standard,
and the exclusionary rule is available as a last resort to prohibit the use of
improperly seized evidence.
C. Barlow's, Inc. v. Usery: Unconstitutionality of OSHA Under the
Fourth Amendment
A conclusion that the fourth amendment precludes warrantless OS-
HA inspections requires an initial determination that the statute cannot be
interpreted to meet fourth amendment standards.
1. The Two Positions on Constitutionality. -The more widely
accepted view is that the OSHA statute should be construed as constitu-
tional 193 under the rules of judicial review articulated by Justice Brandeis
in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority.' 9' Brandeis maintained
that when the validity of an act of Congress is questioned, the Court
should strive to construe it to avoid the constitutional question if such a
construction is probable. This policy has been consistently followed by
189. When violations have been found, however, they may be the basis of a finding of
probable cause and the frequency element will not be determinative. Usery v. Northwest
Orient Airlines, Inc., 5 OSHC 1617 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (probable cause found on showing of
previous violations of OSHA). The validity of this decision is questionable, since past
violations are not indicative of the commission of a current violation and follow-up investi-
gations are provided to ensure that a violation has been corrected. [1977 Reference Binder]
OccuP. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 77:2510-11 (OSHA Field Operations Manual).
190. Greenberg, supra note 40.
191. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 373 (1959); accord, Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 547-48 (1967) (Clark, J., dissenting).
192. This is what the court in Marshall v. Shellcast Corp., 5 OSHC 1689 (N.D. Ala.
1977), was trying to prevent. When specific information to establish probable cause can be
proffered, such a showing should be required rather than using the flexible standard.
193. Usery v. Centrif-Air Machine Co., 424 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Dunlop v.
Hertzler Enterprises, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 627 (D.N.M. 1976); In re Inspection of Rupp Forge
Co., 4 OSHC 1487 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Brennan v. Gibson's Products, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 154
(E.D. Tex. 1976).
194. 297 U.S. 248, 288 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
the Supreme Court with respect to administrative inspections. The Court
in Almeida-Sanchez stated that statutes must be construed in a manner
consistent with the fourth amendment if possible, 95 while it held in
Colonnade that when Congress has authority to inspect but provides no
standards governing the inspection procedure, the fourth amendment
applies.' 96 Finally, the Court in United States v. Hart,97 in accordance
with the Colonnade decision, argued that statutorily created exceptions to
fourth amendment protection must be carefully limited. The Hart court
stressed that the Supreme Court had clearly indicated that congressional
intent to dispense with warrant requirements must be explicitly stated and
not merely implied. 198
In contrast to this position, the district court in Barlow's, Inc. v.
Usery declined "the invitation to judicially redraft an enactment of
Congress"' 99 and found OSHA unconstitutional because its inspection
provisions lacked the essential fourth amendment protections. The court
posited that Congress was certainly able to employ language specifying
the need and procedure for procuring a warrant had it desired to subject
OSHA inspections to that requirement. Thus, it would be denying the
congressional intent to construe the statute to contain these restrictions.
2. Examination of Congressional Intent to Aid in Interpreta-
tion .- The legislative history of OSHA is relatively silent on the point of
the inspection provisions. It does not reveal that Congress intended to
provide for only warrantless inspection, and the only inquiry into the
phrase "without delay" is a discussion indicating that its purpose was to
prevent the employer's evading the presentation of credentials and leav-
ing the inspector powerless to enter. 2 1 Congressman Steiger, sponsor of
the bill and author of the phrase "without delay," cautioned that "in
carrying out inspection duties under this act, the Secretary, of course,
would have to act in accordance with applicable constitutional protec-
tions. "201
A look at post-enactment statements by Congressman Steiger, how-
ever, refutes an intent to require warrants. He has commented that
[w]arrantless civil inspections are both absolutely essential to
this act's enforcement and a long-standing Federal prac-
tice. . . .And the fact remains that any requirement which
would permit employers to turn inspectors away during lengthy
195. 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973).
196. 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970).
197. 359 F. Supp. 835 (D. Del. 1973) (firearms dealer who had lost his license was not
subject to inspection pursuant to a statute authorizing warrantless searches of firearm
licensees).
198. Id at 839.
199. 424 F. Supp. 437, 441 (D. Idaho 1976), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc., 430 U.S. 964 (1977).
200. 116 CONG. REC. 38709 (1970) (remarks of Congressman Galifianokas, quoting
Congressman Steiger).
201. Id. (remarks of Congressman Steiger).
warrant proceedings would make this carefully considered
scheme virtually powerless to reach many injurious working
conditions. 22
Contemporaneous construction of a statute by the officers or agency
charged with its administration is also accorded great deference by the
courts. 20 3 An examination of administrative interpretations shows
Congress did not contemplate an unlimited authority to inspect. 20 4 The
regulations provide that when a compliance officer is refused entry in the
exercise of his official duties, the inspection should be terminated and
prompt, appropriate action, including compulsory process if necessary,
must be taken.20 5 The OSHA Field Operations Manual contains similar
provisions for requesting an inspection warrant in case of refusal of entry
or interference with inspection. 206 When the administration changes its
position on the need for a warrant, which seems to have occurred with the
OSHA administration, the courts should give its initial and more contem-
poraneous interpretation greater weight.
207
Evidence of congressional intent is confusing and conflicting. Under
these circumstances, a presumption that Congress intended to act in a
constitutional manner requiring warrant authorization for nonconsensual
inspections should be maintained.20 8 Even if Congress intended to au-
thorize warrantless inspections, interpreting the statute to meet fourth
amendment requirements is more likely to approximate the congressional
intent than totally eliminating the authority to inspect. Eliminating this
power would constitute a usurpation of the legislative function because it





The Supreme Court has not revealed any intent to create a broad
exception to the warrant requirement for administrative searches. A
warrant should be a prerequisite for OSHA inspections except when
imminent danger brings the inspection within the established exemption
for emergencies. The broad scope of the OSHA statute in terms of the
types of premises that can be searched and the extent of the search shows
the need for the restraints of a warrant. The workplace generally has more
limited expectations of privacy than a home, but since expectation of
privacy is a matter of degree, it does not follow that the expectation is
202. 123 CONG. REC. H163-H164 (daily ed. January 6, 1977).
203. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. I, 16 (1965).
204. In re Inspection of Rupp Forge Co., 4 OSHC 1487 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
205. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4 (1976).
206. [ 1977 Reference Binder] Occup. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA 77:2503) (OSHA
Field Operations Manual).
207. Brennan v. Gibson's Products, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 154, 163 (E.D. Tex. 1976)
(citing Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965)).
208. Usery v. Centrif-Air Machine Co., 424 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
209. 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 173 (4th ed. 1972).
negated by access to the area by other parties. Inspection entails a more
severe intrusion than entry of the public into a public place and places the
employer in jeopardy of being subjected to criminal as well as civil
sanctions. In addition, OSHA regulation of businesses is not so pervasive
and historically rooted that expectations are limited because the regula-
tion might be deemed to function as advance notice of the likelihood of
inspection. Since the expectation of privacy can be justified and the
government's need for warrantless searches has not been demonstrated,
the balance of interests renders a warrantless search unreasonable.
OSHA inspections should be measured by a high standard of indi-
vidualized probable cause in all instances but random inspections. Ran-
dom inspections will be sufficiently limited by testing whether the par-
ticular premises have been selected for inspection in accordance with
articulated administrative standards and by examining the passage of time
since the last inspection.
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures. . . has
not-to put it mildly-run smooth. ' 210 The application of the fourth
amendment to OSHA has not been an exception. The federal courts'
confusion over whether a warrant is required for OSHA inspections has
recently been remedied by the Supreme Court's review of Barlow's, Inc.
v. Usury.21' The relationship between the fourth amendment and OSHA
has been clarified with the court's finding that a warrant is necessary for
all inspections other than those when imminent danger exists.
KAREN A. VON DREUSCHE
210. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring).
211. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 46 U.S.L.W. 4483 (1978). This case was decided
immediately before the printing of this comment and sustains the views of the writer.

